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PRESIDENTIAL SELF-REGULATION
THROUGH RULEMAKING:
COMPARATIVE COMMENTS ON
STRUCTURING THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE'S CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS*
L. Harold Levinson**
Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two part article by
Professor L. Harold Levinson dealing with executive rulemaking.
The first partt appeared in Volume 9, number 4, and examined the
law of the United States and the United Kingdom. This part deals
with France and the European Communities, and concludes with
comparative comments.
* While retaining sole responsibility for the paper, the author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on preliminary drafts of the manuscript of Part II
by Mr. Michael J. Remington (on France), and by Professor Harold G. Maier (on
the European Communities).
Part I of this article appears at 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 695 (1976). The
footnotes to Part II are numbered in sequence to follow those in Part I.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.B.A., LL.B., University of
Miami; LL.M., New York University; J.S.D., Columbia University.
t The footnotes in Part I of this article should be corrected as follows. The
material appearing in footnote 47 should be deleted and the material originally
appearing in footnote 16 should be inserted therein. Footnote 16 should be revised
to read as follows:
16. Literally hundreds of federal statutes not only authorize but also
require agencies to promulgate rules. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857c (1970)
(Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency shall promulgate regulations providing standards for ambient air quality, stationary sources, and
aircraft emission); 10 U.S.C. § 1444 (1970) (President "shall prescribe regulations to carry out the retired servicemen's family protection plan"); 16
U.S.C. § 971d (Supp. V 1975) (Secretary of Commerce is authorized and
directed to adopt such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and objectives of the Atlantic Tunas Convention); 15 U.S.C. §
1604, 1691b (Supp. V 1975) (Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System
"shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes" of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act). With regard
to the procedures to be followed in rulemaking, see notes 46-52 infra and
accompanying text.
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FRANCE

The Fifth Republic was established in 1958, when a referendum
approved the innovative constitution submitted by General De
Gaulle." 4 The basic goal of De Gaulle and his draftsmen was to
154.
TRATIVE
TOME I
(1972);

The discussion generally follows L. BROWN & J. GARNER, FRENCH AnimsNSLAW (2d ed. 1973); A. DE LAUBADtRE, TRArr DE Daorr ADMINISTRATIF,
(6e ed. 1973); 1 D. PicKLEs, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLMICS OF FRANCE
G. VEDEL, DROIT ADMINIsTRAIF (5e ed. 1973); and Nicholas, Loi, Rkgle-

ment and JudicialReview in the Fifth Republic, 1970 PuB. L. 251.
Historical sources are cited in notes 156-57 infra. Other useful sources on contemporary French law are J.-L. DEBRP, LES IDgEs CONSTUTIONNELLES DU GNERAL
DE GAULLE (1974); Beardsley, The ConstitutionalCouncil and ConstitutionalLib-

erties in France,20 AM. J. Comp. L. 431 (1972); Brown, De Gaulle's Republic and
the Rule of Law: Judicial Review and the Conseil d'Etat, 46 B.U. L. REV. 462
(1966); Drago, GeneralComparative View of theFrench Constitution,21 Omo ST.
L.J. 535 (1960); Friedrich, The New French Constitutionin Politicaland Historical Perspective, 72 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1959); Tunc, The Fifth Republic, the
Legislative Power, and Constitutional Review, 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 335 (1960).
The French Constitution, in English translation, appears in D. PICKLEs, supra
at 300; in 3 A. PEASLEE, CoNsrrrurONs OF NATIONs 312 (3d ed., rev. D. Xydis,
1968); with introduction and bibliography, in Flanz & Almany, France, in 4
CONSTITUTiONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A.. Blaustein & G. Flanz, eds.

1971); and in Pickles, French Constitutionof October 4th, 1958: A New Translation and a Commentary, 1959 Pun. L. 228. The October 1974 amendment of
article 61 of the French Constitution, broadening the class of parties who can
invoke the jurisdiction of the Conseil Constitutionnel (see text preceeding note
179, infra) appears in [1974] Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Lagislation344.
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stabilize French government by strengthening the executive in relation to the legislative branch. This purpose was advanced by the
referendum approving the 1962 constitutional amendment. Pursuant to this amendment, the President of the Republic is directly
elected by the people, rather than indirectly by the electoral college created in 1958.'11 Before the functions of the executive under
the 1958 Constitution are discussed, the pre-1958 situation will be
briefly noted.
A.

From the Ancien Regime to the Second Empire5 '

Hereditary kings ruled France, under a claim of divine right, for
the six centuries of the Ancien Regime, ending in 1789. Legislative, executive, and judicial powers were all concentrated in the
hands of the kings. The revolution of 1789 led to a limited monarchy (1791) and the First Republic (1792-1799), in which substantial powers were exercised by elected legislative assemblies. Executive power in the First Republic was vested in a committee of five
directors, whose functions were strictly separated from those of the
legislature. Friction between the directors and the legislature, and
among the directors themselves, led in large part to the collapse
of the First Republic, and the subsequent dictatorship of Napoleon
I (1799-1814). Under Napoleon, extensive formal powers were
vested in a single chief executive (designated Consul until 1804,
and Emperor thereafter). Napoleon did not hesitate to legislate, by
decree, outside the limits of the powers formally conferred upon
him by the Constitution.
The Charter of 1814 established a parliamentary monarchy, in
which the legislature and the king were given collaborative roles.
In addition to participating in the enactment of statutes, the king
possessed the power to promulgate regulations to assure the execution of the laws. Moreover, the king could promulgate his own
security ordinances. A specific exercise of this power precipitated
the Revolution of 1830. This Revolution led to the 1830 Charter
which reduced the king's ordinance-making power.
155. French Constitution, arts. 6, 7, as amended by the referendum of October
28, 1962.
156. The discussion accompanying this and the next note generally follows M.
DUVERGER, DRorr CONSTrruTiONNEL Er INSTrrUTiONS POLmQUEs 395-580 (2e ed.
1956); and Flanz & Almany, supra note 154, "Chronology." Additional valuable

sources are A. COBBAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE (2d ed. 1961); G. LEPOmTE,

HISTOIRE DES INSTITUTIONS DU

(1953).

DRorr Punmc

FRANgAIS AU

XIXE

SItcLE,

1780-1914
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The Second Republic (1848-1852) introduced an Americaninspired separation of powers. Executive power was vested in a
President, elected by universal suffrage, while legislative power
was exercised by an elected assembly. Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte,
the only President to serve under this regime, later became Emperor Napoleon III when it was replaced by the Second Empire
(1852-1870). During all but the final three years of this Empire, the
Emperor had exclusive authority to initiate legislation, and also
had an absolute veto power.
B. The Third and FourthRepublics5'
After its provisional governments (1871-1875), France adopted a
series of constitutional statutes that established the Third Republic, which lasted from 1875 to 1940. In the Third Republic, the
legislature was dominant. The Prime Minister and other ministers
constituting the "government" were responsible to the legislature.
The President was a ceremonial head of state, with limited discretion to invite a new Prime Minister to form a government upon the
fall of the predecessor government, much as the Sovereign functions under the constitutional monarchy of the United Kingdom.
The legislature enjoyed unlimited power to enact statutes. The
Prime Minister and the government had inherent authority to
implement statutes by promulgating rules, deciding matters affecting individuals, assuring enforcement, and supervising the bureaucracy. This authority was interpreted flexibly, especially during times of emergency. The Conseil d'Etat held that even when
no statute had been enacted, the Government could promulgate
rules to preserve the public order or the functioning of public services. ' From time to time, the legislature delegated power to the
executive to issue rules having the effect of statute. These delegations were especially frequent during national emergencies or political crises. While the validity of statutes could not be challenged,
acts of the President, Prime Minister, other ministers, or bureaucrats were all regarded as "administrative" acts, and were subject
to review by the Conseil d'Etat, and to collateral attack by defendants in criminal proceedings.
157. In addition to the sources cited in supranote 156, see frequent references
to the Fourth Republic in many of the works cited in supra note 154, including
especially J.-L DEBR9, D. PicKLEs, and G. VEDEL.
158. Labonne, Conseil d'Etat, 8 aodt 1919; Heyries, Conseil d'Etat, 28 juin
1918; G. VFna, supra note 154, at 20-23; L. BROwN & J. GA-FsR, supra note 154,
at 6-7.
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Following the Vichy R6gime (1940-1944) and the provisional
post-War governments (1944-1946), the wfourth Republic was established in 1946. In many respects it resembled the Third Republic, but some differences between the two are noteworthy. In the
Fourth Republic, general rulemaking power was vested in the
Prime Minister, rather than in the President as in the Third Republic; but this difference was more a matter of form than of
substance, since under the Third Republic the President had generally acted in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
One innovation of the Fourth Republic was the availability of review of the validity of statutes by the Comit6 Constitutionnel.This
review was available, however, only before, not after, the promulgation of a statute.
C. Basic Changes Under the 1958 Constitution
The 1958 Constitution, as amended in 1962, brought about two
basic changes. First, the office of President was greatly strengthened, and since the 1962 amendment, the President has been directly accountable to the people. He must, however, coexist with
the Prime Minister, who exercises considerable power and is responsible to the legislature. The second major change was the enumeration in the Constitution of certain subjects within the power
of the legislature. The executive has retained its traditional power
to implement statutes, and in addition, now has the authority to
legislate on any matter not included in the legislature's enumerated powers. Responsibility for resolving disputes about the
boundary between legislative and executive power is divided between the Conseil Constitutionneland the Conseil d'Etat,5 9
D. Executive Officials
Executive power is shared by the President of the Republic and
the "Government." The Constitution does not spell out the composition of the "Government," but clearly implies the inclusion of the
Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers as a collegial body, and
individual ministers. The Government "determines and directs
159.

The extent of the jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat is regulated by the

Tribunal des Conflits, which determines whether a specific controversy falls
within the ambit of the Conseild'Etator the judicial court system under the Cour

de Cassation.L. BROWN & J. GARNEa, supra note 154, at 76-80; A. DE LAUADtRE,
supra note 154, at § § 698-722.
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the policy of the nation."'' 0 It is responsible to the legislature, and
may be collectively dismissed by a legislative vote of censure or
lack of confidence after the Government has made confidence an
issue. Government members may not concurrently serve in the
legislature. The Government has the sole right to introduce legislative bills or amendments that reduce revenues or increase expenditures. Either the Government or any member of the legislature
may introduce bills on other subjects. Bills introduced by the Government must first be discussed in the Council of Ministers, after
nonbinding consultation with the Conseil d'Etat.The Government
enjoys extensive control over the legislative calendar.
1. Presidentof the Republic. 6'-The President of the Republic
is elected by nationwide balloting. He is Head of State,
Commander-in-Chief, and organ of foreign policy. He grants pardons. He appoints civil and military officers and the Prime Minister, and, upon the recommendation of the latter, other members
of the Government. He promulgates statutes after their passage by
the legislature, and while he has no veto power, he can require the
legislature to reconsider a statute. The President's role is expressed
as follows in article 5 of the Constitution:
He sees that the Constitution is respected. He ensures, by his arbitration, the regular functioning of governmental authorities, as well
as the continuity of the State. He is the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of the nation's territory, and of respect for
treaties and Community agreements.
Article 16 confers special power upon the President, in certain
emergencies, to "take the measures commanded by [the] circumstances." Before declaring the existence of an emergency, the President must have nonbinding consultations with the Prime Minis160. French Const., arts. 20 (government determines and directs policy), 4950 (may be dismissed by Legislature), 23 (members of government may not serve
in Legislature), 40 (prohibition against private members of Legislature introducing financially burdensome bills), 39 (general ability of Prime Minister or private
members to initiate legislation; deliberations in Council of Ministers and consultation with Conseil d'Etat before introduction of government bills), 41-48 (government's control over legislative calendar).
161. Id. arts. 6-7 (election), 5 (Head of State), 15 (Commander-in-Chief), 14
(foreign affairs), 17 (pardons), 13 (appoints civil and military officers), 8 (appoints Prime Minister and other Ministers), 9 (presides over Council of Ministers), 10 (promulgates statutes, and may ask legislature to reconsider). As indicated in the accompanying text, this is an incomplete listing of the powers of the

President of the Republic, intended only to convey the general attributes of the
office.
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ter, the president of each house of the legislature, and the Conseil
Constitutionnel. He must again consult with the Conseil
Constitutionnel on the measures he proposes to take. The legislature must be called into session and must remain in session for the
duration of the emergency.'
2. Prime Minister."3-The Prime Minister directs the operations of the Government. He is responsible for national defense and
ensuring the execution of the laws. Subject to the constitutional
powers of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister is
vested with general regulatory power (to be discussed below). He
also has the power to appoint civil and military officers. He may
delegate certain of his powers to ministers. Finally, he may replace
the President of the Republic as chairman at a meeting of the
Council of Ministers by an explicit delegation and for a specific
agenda.
4
3. Council of Ministers.' "-The
Constitution mentions the
Council of Ministers, but does not specify its composition. Until
1969, as a matter of practice, all ministers were included. In that
year, however, the practice was changed. Now, membership in the
Council is limited to the relatively senior members of the Government, approximately twenty in number, who form about half of
the total number of ministers. The Council meets regularly as the
government's decision-making organ, dealing with the legislative
program as well as executive responsibilities. It is analogous to the
British Cabinet with two important exceptions. First, British Cabinet members must be members of the legislature, and second,
British constitutional law has no equivalent to the role played by
the President of the Republic in the French Council of Ministers.
4. Ministers." 5-Ministers are mentioned in the Constitution,
162. Article 16 has been invoked only once, in 1961. The occasion resulted in
the case of Rubin de Servins, Conseil d'Etat, 2 mars 1962. See A. DE LAUBADARE,
supra note 154, at § 116; Pickles, Special Powers in France-Article 16 in
Practice,1963 Pus. L. 23.
163. French Const., art. 21.
164. Id. arts. 9 (President of the Republic presides over Council of Ministers),
13 (President of the Republic signs such ordinances and decrees as have been

considered in the Council of Ministers); and articles of the Constitution cited in
supra note 160, on the government. See also D. PIcKLEs, supra note 154, at 78-

84; J.-L. DEBRA, supra note 154, at 301, quoting President De Gaulle's memoirs
regarding the weekly meetings of the Council of Ministers over which he presided.
165. French Const., art. 8 (appointment of ministers by President of the Republic, upon recommendation of Prime Minister); and articles of the Constitution
cited in supra note 160, on the government.
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but only with sparing detail as has already been discussed. A minister is a member of the Government, appointed by the President
of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
He may not concurrently serve in the legislature. Senior ministers
participate in the Council of Ministers, but junior ministers do not.
This is a matter of current practice not covered by constitutional
text. The Prime Minister may delegate powers to ministers.
E. Allocation of JurisdictionBetween the Legislature and the
Executive
Article 37 of the Constitution declares: "Matters other than
those that fall within the domain of law (loi) shall be of a regulatory character (caractrer~glementaire)." Thus, unless a topic is
included among the enumerated subjects upon which the legislature may enact a law (loi), the topic is subject to rulemaking by
an executive organ since the topic will be deemed to have regulatory character (caractrer~glementaire).The executive retains its
traditional power to implement statutes and also possesses the
residual lawmaking power remaining after enumeration of the
powers of the legislature.
1. Legislative Powers.-Complications arise because the Constitution contains three separate groups of enumerations defining
the legislative power. In one group, the legislature may determine
only the fundamental principles, leaving the details to be filled in
by the executive.' 8 The topics dealt with in this group include the
general organization of the national defense, the administration of
local government, education, property rights, civil and commercial
obligations and employment, unions, and social security. With
regard to a second group of subjects, the legislature has plenary
power to spell out the details (la loi fixe les r~gles).6 Included in
this category are civil rights, nationality, personal status, marriage, inheritance, the definition of and penalties for felonies and
misdemeanors (implying that petty offenses are not included),
criminal procedure, amnesty, the creation of new courts, the status
of judges, taxation, currency, elections for legislative office, public
institutions, the fundamental guarantees granted to civil service
and military personnel, and the nationalization and denationalization of industry. A third group of subjects is simply listed as part
of the legislative domain, without any specification whether the
166. Id. art. 34, para. 4.
167. Id. art. 34, paras. 2, 3.
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legislature may determine only fundamental principles or may
spell out the details.'6 8 This last group includes finance, national
planning, war, and martial law continued for more than twelve
days after its declaration by the Council of Ministers.
2. Executive Rulemaking Power-A Residual Concept.-As
indicated previously, article 37 vests the executive with rulemaking power on all subjects not included in the enumerated powers
of the legislature. In addition, the executive retains its traditional
power to promulgate rules, in the nature of subordinate legislation,
to fill in the details of matters within the legislative domain.' 9 This
executive power of subordinate legislation is derived from three
general sources. First, with respect to one group of subjects listed
in article 37, the power of the legislature is limited to determining
fundamental principles;' 71 the clear intent of article 37 is, therefore, to empower the executive to fill in the details by rulemaking.
Second, many statutes expressly authorize the executive to promulgate implementing rules, much as the British Parliament and
the United States Congress authorize their respective executives to
adopt subordinate legislation. 7' Third, French tradition recognizes
that the executive enjoys inherent power to adopt rules for the
purpose of implementing statutes, and that rules may be adopted
even without statutes when necessary to maintain public order or
the functioning of public services. 72 All of these forms of executive
rulemaking are apparently preserved within the framework of article 37.
The 1958 Constitution also provides mechanisms permitting the
executive, in limited circumstances, to exercise primary rulemaking power on subjects that would normally fall within the legislative domain, as indicated under the next two headings.
3. Transition to the 1958 Constitution-Derogationof Legislative Powers.-Article 92 established a mechanism for transition
from the old Constitution to the 1958 text. The Council of Ministers, after nonbinding consultation with the Conseil d'Etat, was
authorized to adopt ordinances having the effect of statute
(ordonnancesayant force de loi) to create the institutions required
by the 1958 Constitution, and, until they could be set up, to pro168. Id. art. 34, paras. 5, 6; arts. 35 (war), 36 (martial law).
169. L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 154, at 8; G. VEDEL, supra note 154,
at 20, 42-43,
170. French Const., art. 37.
171. Nicholas, supra note 154, at 254; G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 20, 42-43.
172. See note 158 supra, and accompanying text.
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vide for the functioning of the governmental authorities. These
ordinances could evidently cover any subject, including those that
would normally fall within the enumerated powers of the legislature. The Council of Ministers enacted large numbers of ordinances on important legislative matters during the transitional
period at the beginning of the Fifth Republic. Many of these
ordinances subsequently came up for review before the Conseil
Constitutionnelunder a procedure discussed below."'
4. Delegation of Legislative Power to the Executive. -Article
38 authorizes the legislature, upon request by the Government, to
delegate power to the Government, for a limited period of time, to
adopt ordinances (ordonnances) on subjects that would normally
be within the legislative domain. These ordinances are enacted by
the Council of Ministers after nonbinding consultation with the
Conseil d'Etat. Ordinances come into effect upon publication. If
the enabling act requires legislative ratification by a specified
date, however, the ordinances become void if they are not submitted to the legislature by that date. After expiration of the time
established by the enabling act for the exercise of the delegated
power, jurisdiction returns to the legislature, which alone may
modify ordinances enacted by the Government on subjects within
the legislative domain.
5. The Conseil Constitutionnel.-The1958 Constitution established the Conseil Constitutionnel,with considerably broader powers than those of the Comit6 Constitutionnelof the Fourth Republic. 75 The Conseil Constitutionnel renders final, nonappealable
decisions in a number of situations, and its decisions are binding
on all governmental, administrative, and judicial authorities. 7 ,
The primary role of the Conseil Constitutionnel is to help the
Government confine the legislature to its enumerated powers.'
Another organ-the Conseil d'Etat-bearsresponsibility for keeping the executive within its domain. 8
Article 56 sets the membership of the Conseil Constitutionnelat
nine appointed members, serving nine-year staggered terms, to173.
174.
175.
Waline,
(1964).
176.
177.
178.

Nicholas, supra note 154, at 257.
See text accompanying notes 176-181 infra.
The comparison between the 1946 and 1958 Constitutions is made in
ConstitutionalCouncil of the French Republic, 12 AM. J. Comp. L. 483
French Const., art. 62.
Nicholas, supra note 154, at 256.
See text accompanying notes 184-192 infra.
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gether with all former Presidents of the Republic, who are ex officio
members for life. Three members are appointed by the President
of the Republic, and three each by the presidents of the two houses
of the legislature.
6. Review of LegislativeProposals by the Conseil Constitutionnel Before Passage or Promulgation.-Article 41 states that upon
the request of the Government, or of the president of either house
of the legislature, the Conseil Constitutionnel can rule upon two
types of challenges to the validity of a pending legislative bill: (1)
challenges raising the question whether the bill exceeds the enumerated powers of the legislature; and (2) challenges raising the
question whether the legislature has temporarily relinquished its
power over the subject by a delegation of ordinance-making power
to the Government.
Article 61 authorizes the Conseil Constitutionnel to rule upon
the constitutionality of any statute, after passage by the legislature, but before promulgation by the President of the Republic. In
this context, the "constitutionality" of the statute depends upon
whether it is within the enumerated powers of the legislature. This
review must be initiated for certain types of enactments, namely,
organic laws and legislative rules of procedure. For any other statute, review may be initiated at the request of the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, the president of either house of the
legislature, or 60 members of either house of the legislature.
The fact that constitutional review is available, but not mandatory (except for organic laws and legislative procedures), permits
the Government to tolerate, and even to encourage, the enactment
of statutes which encroach upon the executive domain."'9 Such
statutes are perfectly valid unless and until an eligible party seeks
and obtains a determination of invalidity from the Conseil
Constitutionnel. Political factors sometimes motivate the Government to refrain from complaining to the Conseil Constitutionnel
about a legislative encroachment. The Government, however,
never loses its right to seek relief under article 37.
7. Review of "Legislative Texts" by the Conseil Constitutionnel After Enactment.-Article 37 makes the crucial statement,
previously noted, that matters falling outside the enumerated powers of the legislature are subject to the rulemaking power of the
179. Nicholas, supra note 154, at 262, citing P. Louis-Lucas, refers to the
government's discretion in this matter as a "safety-valve," needed to prevent an
"explosion" which could result if the government is too rigid in insisting upon the
exclusive right to legislate within its domain.
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executive. It also specifies that the executive may issue decrees to
modify "legislative texts" on matters that are within the executive
domain, after nonbinding consultation with the Conseil d'Etat.
This "nonbinding" consultation with the Conseil d'Etat is highly
persuasive to the Government since litigation could bring the matter back to the Conseil. Even though the consultation would involve an administration section, while the litigation would involve
the litigation section of the Conseil, the two sections are unlikely
to reach different interpretations of the executive domain under
article 37.
For "legislative texts" that were enacted after the effective date
of the 1958 Constitution, article 37 imposes an additional requirement-the Conseil Constitutionnel must determine that the subject matter is within the executive domain. In this context,
"legislative text" means not only statutes passed by the legislature
and promulgated by the President of the Republic, but also ordinances adopted by the executive under the transitional provisions
of article 92.180
The effect of article 37, then, is to give the Government a free
hand to issue decrees in derogation of pre-1958 "legislative texts"
on matters that the 1958 Constitution places within the executive
domain, subject to consultation with the Conseil d'Etat. As regards post-1958 "legislative texts," the Government may not take
such action without first asking the Conseil Constitutionnel to
declare that the subject matter is within the executive domain.
The Government may seek this relief, even if it failed to complain
when the legislative text was adopted, or previously asserted that
the matter was within the legislative domain, or sponsored the
statute, or adopted the ordinance under article 92 under the theory
that the matter was within the legislative domain. The Conseil
Constitutionnel has, in fact, entertained numerous petitions in
which the Government has asserted the executive nature of a matter that the Government had previously regarded as legislative,
and the Conseil has not held the Government estopped from
"'
changing its mind.18
8. The Conseil d'Etat. '-The Conseil d'Etat was created -by
180.
181.

182.

See text accompanying and preceding note 173 supra.
Nicholas, supra note 154, at 257-58.
See generally L. BROWN &J. GARNER, supra note 154, at 19-26; C. FREEDE-

MAN, THE CONSEIL D'ETAT IN MODERN FRANCE (1961); M. RENDEL, THE ADMINISTRAMVE FUNCTIONS OF THE FRENCH CONSEIL D'ETAT (1970); Cake, The French Conseil

d'Etat: An Essay on Administrative Jurisprudence,24 AD. L. Rv. 315, 317-19
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Napoleon I in 1799. Its structure and composition have been
changed by statutes from time to time, but its processes and decisional principles are, to a great extent, the product of its own case
law (jurisprudence).Until 1872, the Conseil d'Etat was, in theory,
an advisory body. Since then, the Conseil d'Etat has possessed
statutory authority to decide cases brought against the administration, rather than merely to advise how the cases should be decided.
The Conseil d'Etathas approximately 250 members, of whom as
many s 100 are likely to be serving at any one time on "detached
service," that is, as temporary, full-time consultants to various
ministries or governmental departments.' 3 The remaining members are divided between the two major functions-litigation and
administration. Members of the Conseil d'Etat rotate, to some
extent, between the litigation section, the administration sections,
and detached service. The litigation section, working through its
specialized subsections under a highly developed procedure, decides cases involving the validity of administrative actions. In the
great majority of these cases the plaintiff is a private citizen, association, or business, and the defendant is an administrative agency
or official. The four administration sections-Interior, Finance,
Public Works, and Social-serve as legal advisors to the Government. Among other functions, these sections consult with the Government, as required by the Constitution, before the Government
introduces any legislative bill, or adopts a decree under article 37,
or adopts an ordinance under article 38.
Most of the Conseil d'Etat members are recruited from the top
of the graduating class of the elite National School of Administration. The remaining recruits join the Conseil d'Etat at later stages
of their careers, after having distinguished themselves in active
administration. Once recruited, members generally serve until retirement age. All members have equal votes, but the amount of
influence attached to the vote, and the functions assigned to individuals vary according to age and experience.
9. Role of the Conseil d'Etat in Resolving Jurisdictionaland
Other Disputes.-The 1958 Constitution requires nonbinding consultation with the Conseil d'Etat in a number of situations,,"' but
(1972); Remington, The Tribunaux Administratifs: Protectors of the French
Citizen, 51 Tu-. L. REv. 33, 38-48 (1976).
183. L. BRowN & J. GARNER, supra note 154, at 31-42; Remington, supra note
182, at 48-53; Brown, Participationof the French Conseil d'Etat in Legislation,
48 TuL. L. REv. 796 (1974).
184. French Const., arts. 37 (decrees modifying "legislative texts"), 38 (ordi-
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does not create the Conseil d'Etat or describe its composition or
process. Neither does the Constitution mention the vital role
played by the Conseil d'Etat in resolving jurisdictional and other
disputes arising from the exercise of executive rulemaking power.
Until 1953 the Conseil d'Etat itself was the tribunal of original
and final jurisdiction in most administrative law litigation., 5 Decrees designed to relieve the overburdened Conseil were promulgated in that year, pursuant to enabling statutes. The decrees
created a nationwide network of administrative tribunals
(tribunaux administratifs), which took over most of the original
jurisdiction, leaving the Conseil d'Etat with original jurisdiction
only in limited situations and appellate jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the tribunaux administratifsand certain other bodies.
The original jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat, although limited by
the reform of 1953, includes matters especially relevant to the present article, such as proceedings to annul a decree or a rule promulgated by a minister, and proceedings to challenge the validity of
any administrative act applicable beyond the geographical jurisdiction of any single tribunaladministratif.
Case law of the Conseil d'Etat,'as interpreted by scholarly
doctrine, has developed four basic grounds on which an administrative act may be declared invalid: incompetence (lack of jurisdiction); vice de forme (improper procedure or failure to adhere to the
correct formalities); d~tournementde pouvoir (improper purpose);
and violation de la loi (literally, "violation of statute," but used
more generally to include various other grounds recognized by case
law, such as errors of fact or errors in applying the law to the
facts).'' In examining the challenged administrative act to determine whether a declaration of invalidity would be justified on any
of these grounds, the Conseil d'Etat considers not only the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions, but also principes g~nkraux du droit or general principles of law. These principles, emerging from the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat as decisional rules
emerge from common law precedents, encompass many standards
nances under delegation of power from Legislature), 39 (government bills), 92
(transitional ordinances).
185. The history and current status of the administrative tribunals and their
relationship with the Conseil d'Etat are presented in Remington, supra note 182,
at 54-67; and L. BRovN & J. GARNER, supra note 154, at 23-29.
186. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 154, at §§ 930-73; L. BROWN & J. GARNER,

supra note 154, at 126-34; Remington, supra note 182, at 86.
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that approximate American notions of due process and equal pro87
tection. 1
The Conseil d'Etat has been willing to review the validity of all
executive acts, whether they were adopted as a result of delegations of power from the legislature, or in reliance upon the constitutional authority of the executive over matters within the executive
domain.118 When the executive seeks to justify its action by asserting that the matter falls within the executive domain, this assertion becomes one of the issues for examination by the Conseil
d'Etatin its review of the validity of the executive act. The Conseil
d'Etat can declare an executive act invalid on grounds of
incompetence (lack of jurisdiction) if the Conseil finds that the
executive was erroneous in asserting that the matter was within
the executive domain. Thus, the Conseil d'Etat can confine the
executive to its own domain, somewhat as the Conseil
Constitutionnel can use its own peculiar methods to confine the
legislature to its constitutional domain.
10. Review of Executive Acts by CollateralAttack in Criminal
and Civil Courts.-The French administration has various methods of enforcing compliance with its rules.' 9 One method, available
in many but by no means all situations, is criminal prosecution for
the petty offense (contravention) of violating an executive rule.'90
A defendant may raise the defense of l'exception d'ill~galit6,which
asserts that the rule is invalid and can therefore be disobeyed with
impunity. 9 ' The criminal courts are required to examine the validity of a rule when l'exception d'ill~galit6 is asserted. This departs
from the general principle that the validity of executive acts is
187. A.DE LAuBADgRE, supranote 154, at § 423; L. BROWN &J. GARNER, supra
note 154, at 118-26.
188. L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 154, at 7; Nicholas, supra note 154,
at 262-67; Soc. Anon. Librairie Frangois Masp~ro, Conseil d'Etat, 8 octobre 1971,
Note, Dreyfus, [1972] D.S. Jur. 212.
189. See generally Levinson, Enforcement of Administrative Decisions in the
United States and France, 23 EMORY L. J. 11, 321 (1974).
190. The French penal code is supplemented by a series of Rfglements
d'administrationpublique, which, among other things, define contraventionsde
police (petty offenses). One such contravention is defined in art. R.26. 15°, as
follows: "Ceux qui auront contravenue aux d~crets et arret~s legalement faits par
l'autorit6 administrative ou aux arr6t~s publi~s par l'autorit6 municipale" (those
who disobey decrees or ministerial rules legally adopted by the executive, or rules
published by the municipal authorities). See note 191 infra.
191.

See generally, R.-G. SCHWARTrzNBERu,

L'AUTORITA

DE CHOSE DPCIDgE

329-45 (1969); Levinson, supra note 189, at 47-48, 59-61; L. BROWN & J.
supra note 154, at 74-75; G. VEDE, supra note 154, at 145-48.

GARNER,
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reviewed only by the tribunaux administratifs and the Conseil
d'Etat. Thus, if the executive promulgates a rule on a subject
matter within the legislative domain without proper authorization
under the delegation provisions of article 38, a defendant prosecuted for violation of this rule may successfully assert its invalidity
as a defense in the criminal court.
The civil courts are authorized only in rare circumstances to
determine the validity of executive acts. The civil courts have
broader latitude to interpret executive acts. This power to interpret can significantly affect the impact of the executive act upon
the parties.'93
F. Types of Executive Rulemaking
The rulemaking power of the executive is exercised in various
forms.
1. Ordinances.-Article 38 authorizes the legislature to delegate power to the Government, for a limited time, to enact ordinances (ordonnances)on matters that are normally within the legislative domain. Ordinances must be enacted in meetings of the
Council of Ministers, after consultation with the Conseil d'Etat,
and signed by the President of the Republic, with countersignatures by the Prime Minister and any other appropriate ministers.
2. Decrees Issued by the Presidentof the Republic.-The President of the Republic exercises his rulemaking power by issuing
decrees." 4 When the President of the Republic declares the existence of an emergency pursuant to article 16, he may take appropriate "measures" through decrees signed only by himself. In
normal circumstances, the President may take only a few types
192. Such a determination can be made when executive acts seriously prejudice a property right. Drago, Appreciation de la l~galitk d'un acte administratif
r6glementairepar une juridiction non r~pressive de 'ordre judiciare,[1975] D.S.
Jur. 671.
193. G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 143-44.
194. The constitutional provisions dealing with the need for a countersignature refer to the actes (acts) of the President of the Republic (art. 19) and of the
Prime Minister (art. 22). The term dAcret (decree) is used in the text of the
Constitution only to refer to formal actions of the Council of Ministers (arts. 13,
37) other than ordonnances(ordinances) under art. 38. However, doctrinal writing
seems to use the term d~cret to refer to all rulemaking acts of the President of
the Republic and Prime Minister, whether or not these result from meetings of
the Council of Ministers. See D. PICKLES, supra note 154, at 83; G. VEDEL, supra
note 154, at 181-82; J.-L.- DEBR9, supra note 154, at 303-05 (on President of the
Republic).
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of action on his own signature. These actions, which can hardly be
regarded as rulemaking, include the appointment of the Prime
Minister, dissolution of the legislature, messages to the legislature,
and petitions for review addressed to the Conseil Constitutionnel.'95 Other acts of the President of the Republic require
the countersignatures of the Prime Minister and other appropriate
ministers; 96 such "acts" are issued in the form of decrees.
Some of these decrees result from meetings of the Council of
Ministers, but others do not. The President of the Republic, as
permanent chairman of the Council of Ministers, effectively controls its agenda, and can thus determine which matters will be
considered at its meetings. 97 He may include any type of executive
business on the agenda of the Council of Ministers. Once a matter
has been considered by the Council, the President can issue a
decree with appropriate countersignatures. 9
President De Gaulle extended his decree-making power, not only
by bringing items of his choice before the Council of Ministers, but
also by personally intervening in other matters that did not come
before the Council. He believed that the general constitutional
mission of the President of the Republic justifies personal intervention, at his discretion, in a wide range of matters that would otherwise be handled by the Prime Minister or by individual ministers.
De Gaulle drew up a list of topics on which he expected to be
personally consulted and regarding which he would sign decrees,
with appropriate countersignatures by the Prime Minister and
other appropriate ministers, without deliberation in the Council of
Ministers. 99' The Conseil d'Etat approved the validity of decrees
195.

French Const., arts. 8 (appointment of Prime Minister), 12 (dissolution

of Legislature), 18 (messages to Legislature), 61 (petition to Conseil
Constitutionnelfor review of constitutionality of pending legislative bill). These
matters, and a few others in which the President of the Republic may act without
countersignature, are listed in art. 19.
196. Id. art. 19.
197. J.-L. DEBtRP, supra note 154, at 301; D. PICKLES, supra note 154, at 13940. Pickles states at 139: "[the] President's domain could be extended at any
time and anywhere by personal interventions in affairs that happened to interest
him, perhaps only temporarily."
198. French Const., art. 13.
199. J.-L. DEBR9, supra note 154, at 303-04. The following major categories are
included: organization and functioning of the government; publication and implementation of international treaties; judges and the guarantees of their independence; certain categories of civil servants; basic policy of national defense and
military affairs; and rules regarding the national Legion of Honor. See also Avril,
Les d6crets r~glementaires du president de la Rpublique non d~libr6s en
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resulting from this practice. 211
3. Decrees Issued by the Prime Minister.-Article 21 confers
regulatory power (le pouvoir r~glementaire)upon the Prime Minister, subject to the powers conferred by the Constitution upon the
President of the Republic. In exercising the regulatory power, the
Prime Minister issues decrees, which must be countersigned,
"when circumstances so require, by the minister responsible for
their execution.""'' Thus, the Prime Minister may issue decrees in
areas not preempted by the President of the Republic.
4. Rules Issued by Ministers.-Article 21 authorizes the Prime
Minister to delegate certain of his powers to ministers. Under such
a delegation, or under an express provision of statute, a minister
may promulgate his own rules. The most formal ministerial rule
is the arr t6.112 Although the Prime Minister issues his rules in the
form of decrees when acting as head of government, he issues rules
in the form of arrft~s when acting as the minister in charge of
certain departmental functions.0 3
5. Informal Statements by Ministers.-Ministers also issue
less formal statements, including circulaires,instructions de service, mesures d'ordre intkrieur, and directives."4 These statements
are generally regarded as internal agency documents, subject to
review by the Conseil d'Etat only when the agency takes further
action that specifically affects parties outside the agency. The affected parties may seek review of such specific action, including
review of any relevant aspects of the informal statement underlying the specific action. In some situations, however, the Conseil
d'Etathas recognized that an informal statement, by its own force,
affects the citizen. In these situations, an affected citizen may
either require the minister to be bound by the informal statement,
under a type of estoppel, or the citizen may be permitted to seek
review of the validity of the informal statement before the Conseil
d'Etat. In essence, then, a statement that is informal on its face
may be treated as if it were formal if this more closely reflects its
effect.
Conseil des ministres, 1976 AcruALrrt JURIDIQUE Daorr

ADMINISMTRATIF 116.
Sicard, Conseil d'Etat, 27 avril 1962, noted in J.-L. DEBR9, supra note
305; G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 182.
French Const., art. 22.
D. PICKLES, supra note 154, at 83-84; G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 182.
G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 183.
Delvolve, La notion de directive, 1974 AcTuALrIr JURIDIQUE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 459; G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 175-80. A citizen has no standing
to challenge an interpretative circular. Escard, Conseil d'Etat, 23 avril 1975.

200.
154, at
201.
202.
203.
204.
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G. Procedurefor PreparingExecutive Rules
The Constitution does not detail the procedure for preparing
executive rules other than the requirements previously discussed,
including participation of the Council of Ministers in some situations, nonbinding consultation with the Conseil d'Etat in specially
defined circumstances, signatures and countersignatures by the
appropriate officials, and legislative authorization before the executive may issue ordinances under article 38.
Statutes sometimes require the executive to follow special procedures before promulgating a rule. An important example is the
reglement d'administrationpublique.0 5 When this procedure is
mandated, the executive must proceed by means of decree, after
consultation with the Conseil d'Etat. In practice, this often means
that the Conseil d'Etatserves as a drafting agency for the Government.
In other situations, statutes require an agency to consult with
the affected parties or their purported representatives, such as
student organizations, when proposed university rules are under
consideration.21 In rare situations, an agency is required to conduct enquites (public meetings) in order to receive citizen input,
primarily in zoning and development matters.
H.

Statement of Reasons

The Constitution does not address the question whether decrees
and other executive acts must be accompanied by a statement of
reasons. As a general principle, French administrative law does not
require all administrative acts to be accompanied by a motivation
stating the reasons underlying the act. 27 Some statutes impose
such a requirement in connection with delegations of rulemaking
authority. In addition, some decisions of the Conseil d'Etat have
selectively imposed the motivation requirement, even when not
imposed by statute, if it appears to be necessary to aid review by
the Conseil. Even if the administrative act does not have to be
205. A. DE LAuBADtRE, supra note 154, at § 103; G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at
186-89; M. RENDEL, supra note 182, at 279.
206. Ferrier, La participationdes administr6s aux dcisions de l'administration, 1974 REvUE DU DRorr PUBLIc 663.
207. A. DE LAUBADgRE, supra note 154, at § 502; Sur, Sur l'obligation de
motiver formellement les actes administratifs, 1974 AcTUALrr9 JuRmiQUE DRorr

ADMINISTRATIF 349;
ISTRATIF,

ENCYCL. DALLOZ, RPERTOIRE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET ADMIN-

V' "Ddcret," § 33 (mis i jour 1974).
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issued with a motivation, a reviewing tribunal can insist upon a
statement of reasons during the review proceedings. In practice,
decrees appear to be accompanied by extensive motivation.
I. Publication and Effective Date
The Constitution provides that ordinances adopted under article
38 shall become effective upon publication, but does not describe
what type of publication is required. The Constitution contains no
other provisions on publication or effective date. A decree adopted
in 1870, and still in effect, requires all statutes and decrees to be
published in the Journal Officiel and to become effective on or
after the date of publication. 2 8 Evidently, ordinances adopted
under article 38 must also be published in the same manner.
Specific statutes may provide for publication of arr~t~s and
other types of executive rulemaking in a particular manner. In the
absence of any statutory provision, "general principles" require
publication in a manner reasonably appropriate for the class of
persons affected by the rule. 09 Citizens do not appear to have
general access to the dossiers of background materials prepared by
agencies in connection with rulemaking.
J.

Binding Effect-ParallelJurisdictionand Form

French doctrine recognizes the dual concepts of paralllismedes
comp~tences and parall~lismedes formes. According to these concepts, the act of an agency is binding upon the agency as well as
upon other parties unless and until it is superseded by a later act
issued pursuant to the same grant of jurisdiction, and in the same
form as the original-unless a higher authority intervenes.2 1 ° This
means that in an individual case, an agency may not take action
inconsistent with a pre-existing rule of the same agency.
The agency may abrogate its own rules at any time, provided
that the abrogation is accomplished in a form parallel to that used
when the rule was adopted, and provided also that the abrogation
has no retroactive effects. The agency is further obliged to abrogate
its rule, upon the request of any affected party, if necessary to
208. D~cret du 5 novembre 1870, in ENCYCL. DALLoz, RPERTOIRE DE DROIT
PUBLIC Er ADMnAIs ,TnI,V ° "D~cret," § 206 (mise A jour 1974).

209. G. VEDEL, supra note 154, at 193-94.
210.. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 154, at §§ 418, 476, 503. In section 418,
De Laubadbre states that an agency may not violate its own rules, in view of the
maxim: Patere legem quam fecisti.
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conform the rule to changed circumstances. This obligation is en2 11
forced by the Conseil d'Etat.
No other situation has been found
in which French law recognizes the right of an afffected party to
compel an agency to consider the adoption, repeal, or modification
of a rule.
V.
A.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

21 2
The Three Communities

The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951, and effective in 1952, established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The original Member States were Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The basic purpose was to establish a common market for coal and steel, and to promote economic expansion, increased employment, and a rising standard of
living in the Member States. The same six states extended the
scope of their cooperation by signing the two Treaties of Rome in
1957 (effective in 1958), establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom). The mission of the EEC, as stated in article 2 of the
EEC Treaty, is "to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of
the standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it." The mission of Euratom is to promote and control
atomic power industries.
211. A. DE LAUBADtRE, supra note 154, at § 563.2.
212. The European Communities were established by Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140
(1957) ("Treaty of Paris"); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958); and Treaty Establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167 (1958) ("Treaties of Rome"). The authoritative English texts of the
treaties may be found in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Office for Official Publications of the EUROPEAN Communities, 1973).
The'original six members of the communities were joined by other members,
pursuant to Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, The Kingdom of Norway, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, January 22, 1972 ("Treaty of Brussels"). On the same
date, the Council of the European Communities rendered a "decision" approving
the accession of the same new members to the ECSC, under authority of art. 98
of the ECSC Treaty.
The treaties and other documents of the European Communities are compiled
in SWEET & MAXWELL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW. The EEC
Treaty receives primary emphasis, together with annotations, in 2 CoMm. MKT.
REP. (CCH),
4300-4916.
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The 1972 Treaty of Accession offered membership in all three
communities to Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom, subject to ratification by each of the prospective new members. After a referendum Norway declined to ratify. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the original. six, bringing the
total membership of the communities to nine states.
B. Institutions of the Communities"3
The Treaty of Paris created four institutional organs for the
ECSC: the Special Council of Ministers (Council), the High Authority, the Common Assembly (Assembly), and the Court of Justice." '4 The Treaties of Rome established similar institutions for
the EEC and Euratom. 25 A convention signed the same day as the
Treaties of Rome provided that a single Assembly would serve as
the assembly for all three communities, and that a single court of
justice would serve as the court for all three communities. Each
The Commentaries found most useful in preparation of this article are D. LASOK
& J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (1973); R. LAUWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE OF COMMUNITY
DECISIONS (1973); and P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
(1972).
Other useful general sources are BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(P. Dagtoglou ed. 1975); N. ELLES, COMMUNITY LAW THROUGH THE CASES (1973);
D. GIJLSTRi, H. SCHERMERS, E. VdLKER & J. WINTER, LEADING CASES AND MATERIALS OF THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1975); F. JACOBS & A. DURAND,
REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT: PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE (1975); P. KAPTmN
& P. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1973); A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW (1973); A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INsTITuTIONS-COOPERATION: INTEGRATION: UNIFICATION (3d ed. 1973); THE LAW OF THE
COMMON MARKET (B. Wortley ed. 1974); Ehlermann, Legal Status, Functioning,

and Probable Evolution of the Institutions of the European Communities, 10
COMM. MKT. L.R. 195 (1973); Henig, rapporteur, The InstitutionalStructure of
the European Communities, 12 J. COMM. MKT. STUDIES 373 (1974); Norton,
Overview of the European Community Law: A Primer for Businessmen and
Attorneys, 29 Sw. L.J. 347 (1975); Van Hulle, The Institutions of the European
Communities in a ChangingPolitical Climate, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 589 (1975).
213. The institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom were merged by the
Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities (Merger Treaty), April 8, 1965, [1967] O.J. EUR. COMM. 2. The
authoritative English text may be found in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 745 (1973). The Merger Treaty did not centralize the consultative
bodies serving the communities. See notes 259-263 infra and accompanying text.
214. ECSC, art. 7.
215. Euratom, art. 3; EEC, art. 4.
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community had its own separate council and its own separate high
authority (or commission, as the equivalent organ was described
in the Treaties of Rome). The merger treaty of 1965 (effective in
1967) provided that all three communities would be served by one
council, one commission, one assembly, and one court. These centralized institutions perform the various missions imposed by the
three treaties. The powers and procedures of the institutions vary
somewhat depending on which treaty is involved.
1. Council.2 18-The Council is composed of one representative
of the government of each Member State. In practice, this does not
mean that a single individual serves as permanent representative
of his government on the Council. Instead, the government of each
Member State assigns various ministers to serve, one at a time, as
its Council member. A nation's foreign minister normally attends
Council meetings, together with other ministers, with one succeeding the other as various points come up on the agenda. 2'7 The
Council is assisted by a committee of the permanent representatives of the Member States to the communities.2 18 This committee
prepares projects for the periodic meetings of the Council and follows through with tasks assigned by the Council.
Under all three treaties the Council controls the accession of new
states and the submission of amendments to the treaties.1 9 The
Council also endeavors to harmonize and coordinate the activities
of Member States with the policies of the Communities." The
Council approves budgets for community operations, subject to
limited supervision by the Assembly.21 Beyond these generalities,
the powers of the Council vary according to the three treaties.
The Council's power is at its minimum when it is functioning
under the ECSC Treaty. Under this treaty, if the Commission fails
to act with regard to certain matters, a Member State may complain to the Council, which may then act, but only by unanimous
vote. In general, however, under the ECSC Treaty the Council
functions merely as a consultative body, and the Commission
216. ECSC, arts. 26-30; EEC, arts. 145-53; Euratom, arts. 115-22; Merger
Treaty, arts. 1-8.
217. SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B10-332.
218. Merger Treaty, art. 4; SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B8-038,
B10-343; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 113-15.
219. ECSC, art. 98; EEC, art. 237; Euratom, art. 205 (accession of new
states), ECSC, art. 96; EEC, art. 236; Euratom, art. 204 (amendments).
220. ECSC, art. 26; EEC, art. 145; Euratom, art. 115.
221. ECSC, art. 78; EEC, art. 203; Euratom, art. 177.
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makes decisions.222 The EEC and Euratom Treaties confer regulatory power upon both the Council and the Commission. 223 These

treaties include significant detail concerning the types of regulatory action permitted, the legal effect of each, and the procedures
necessary before and after promulgation of regulations. The EEC
and Euratom Treaties place a number of subjects within the control of the Council, which is generally authorized to act upon a
proposal from the Commission.224 The Council may amend a Commission proposal only by unanimous vote; otherwise, the Council
can accept, reject, or remand the proposal to the Commission for
reconsideration. Thus, Commission proposals may be redrafted a
number of times during the dialogue between Council and Commission preceding approval. The Council also enjoys residual
power under the following provision of the EEC and Euratom
Treaties:
If action by the community should prove necessary to attain one of
the objectives of the community and this treaty has not provided the
necessary powers, the council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the commission2 and after consulting the assembly, take
the appropriate measures . 1

2. Commission. 2 6-The Commission is composed of thirteen
members, or such other number as the Council may provide by
unanimous vote.227 Commissioners are appointed by mutual agreement between the Member States. Commissioners serve four-year
renewable terms; they may not engage in any other occupation,
paid or unpaid; and must neither seek nor accept instructions from
any national government or other body. Each commissioner must
be a national of one of the Member States, and not more than two
commissioners may be nationals of any one state. The whole Com222. ECSC, arts. 58, 59, 61. The same treaty confers regulatory power upon
the Council, art. 14, but only "[i]n order to carry out the tasks assigned to it."
These tasks are significantly less comprehensive than those conferred upon the
Council under the EEC and Euratom Treaties. See notes 223-25 infra and accompanying text, and D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 111.
223. EEC, art. 189; Euratom, art. 161.
224. EEC, art. 149; Euratom, art. 119; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212
at 111-12. The weighted voting of Council members is provided by EEC, art. 148;
Euratom, art. 118.
225. EEC, art. 235; Euratom, art. 203. A more limited type of residual power
is vested in the Council under the ECSC, art. 95.
226. ECSC, arts. 8-19; EEC, art. 155; Euratom, arts. 124, 134-35; Merger
Treaty, arts. 9-19.
227. Merger Treaty, art. 10.
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mission must resign if the assembly passes a vote of censure by
two-thirds majority, and an individual commissioner can be removed by order of the Court of Justice, upon the application of
either the Commission or the Council, if the Court finds him guilty
of serious misconduct.228 The Commission supervises a staff of several thousand, organized by subject matter departments, 9 and
each commissioner is assisted by his personal staff.
The relative functions of the Commission and the Council vary
depending on which treaty is involved. Under the ECSC Treaty
the Commission is the general decision-maker and need only consult with the Council. The reverse is generally true under the EEC
and Euratom Treaties, where the Council makes decisions upon
the proposal of the Commission. Another noteworthy distinction is
that the ECSC and Euratom Treaties spell out, in considerable
detail, the specific norms to be followed by the Communities. The
discretion of the Council and the Commission is thereby narrowly
restricted. The broader EEC Treaty, however, permits great discretion in its implementation."' This is generally carried out by the
Council, upon the proposal of the Commission. In some areas,
particularly with regard to Community agricultural policy, the
Council has delegated some of its authority to the Commission to
21
fill in the details of the Council's basic policies. 1
The ECSC Treaty requires the Commission to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, 3 2 and the EEC and Euratom
Treaties require the Commission to see that the provisions of the
treaties and the measures taken pursuant to them are carried
out.m This responsibility empowers the Commission to exercise its
regulatory power through formal action and to engage in direct but
informal contacts with states or commercial enterprises to encourage or coordinate compliance with the policies of the Communities.
Under the ECSC the Commission investigates allegations of infringements of Treaty obligations. 3 4 Upon finding a violation, the
Commission notifies the state of the corrective action needed. If
228. Merger Treaty, arts. 10, 13; ECSC, art. 24; EEC, art. 144; Euratom, art.
114.
229. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 103.
230. SwEEr & MAxwELL, supra note 212, at B10-329, B10-352; D. LASOK & J.
BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 104, 111.
231. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 106.
232. ECSC, art. 8.
233. EEC, art. 155; Euratom, art. 124.
234. ECSC, art. 88.
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the state refuses to act, the Commission may, upon a two-thirds
vote of the Council, authorize the withholding of money due to the
defaulting state by the Communities or by other Member States.
The Commission may also impose a monetary penalty upon any
commercial enterprise. All of these sanctions are subject to review
by the Court of Justice.
Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties a simpler procedure is
provided.235 When the Commission believes that a Member State
has failed to fulfill any of its obligations under the treaties, the
Commission shall, after giving the state an opportunity to submit
comments, issue a reasoned opinion. If the state does not comply
with the opinion, the Commission may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
All three treaties confer a number of financial and administrative functions upon the Commission." 6 It represents the legal personality of the Communities and speaks for the Communities in
negotiations with non-member states and international organizations, subject to the authority of the Council to make decisions
regarding external affairs. The Commission is custodian of the
communities' funds and executes the budgets after approval by
the Council.
3. Assembly. 23 -The Assembly consists of 198 members, of
whom France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are
allocated 36 each, Belgium and the Netherlands 14 each, Denmark
and Ireland 10 each, and Luxembourg 6.21 Delegates are nominated by the respective national legislatures according to their own
procedures. The treaties provide for the formulation of a procedure
for election of members by direct universal suffrage, but this has
yet to be accomplished.29
The Assembly has adopted the title "European Parliament,"
and in some respects is organized like continental European legislatures, with multinational political groups, and with standing
committees that examine and report on business before debate
235. EEC, art. 169; Euratom, art. 141.
236. ECSC, art. 78; EEC, art. 205; Euratom, art. 179.
237. ECSC, arts. 20-25; EEC, arts. 137-44; Euratom, arts. 107-14; Convention
on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, March 25, 1957,
arts. 1-2 in SWEET & MAxWELL, supra note 212, at B8-029.
238. ECSC, art. 21; EEC, art. 139; Euratom, art. 108.
239. SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B10-314; COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY
THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE

NINE

STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AT

THEIR MEETING IN PARIS ON DECEMBER 9 AND 10,

MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B13-016, B13-018.

1974

CMND.

5830, in SWEET &
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begins in plenary session. 21
The treaties vest only limited power in the Assembly. It can
force the resignation of the Commission by a vote of censure
passed by a two-thirds majorityY11 The Assembly members may
propound written or oral questions to the Commission, and the
Assembly debates the Commission's annual report on activities of
the Communities. 2 2 The EEC Treaty requires the Council, acting
on a proposal from the Commission, to consult with the Assembly
before adopting regulations or directives to implement the Treaty
24 3
provisions on unfair competition.
4. Court of Justice.24 4-The Court of Justice consists of at least
nine judges, assisted by at least four Advocates-General. 25 The
number of judges and Advocates-General can be increased by
unanimous vote of the Council, upon request of the Court. The
current number of officials reflects such an increase, made after
the 1972 Treaty of Accession. Judges and Advocates-General are
chosen "from the persons whose independence is beyond doubt and
who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the
highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are
jurisconsults of recognized competence. ' 246 They are appointed for
six-year staggered terms by common accord of the governments of
the Member States and are eligible for reappointment.
Each treaty requires the Court to ensure legality in the interpretation and application of the treaty, and each treaty expressly
authorizes the Court to review acts of the Council and of the Commission, and to invalidate them on certain grounds. 7 The Court
is authorized to entertain complaints alleging Council or Commis240. SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B10-312.
241. See note 228 supra.
242. ECSC, arts. 23-24; EEC, art. 140; Euratom, art. 110.
243. EEC, art. 87. Pursuant to this procedure, the Council adopted Regulation 17/62, effective March 13, 1962, in SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at
B10-202, C4-009. Practice under this Regulation is discussed by Meessen, The
Application of the Antitrust Rules of the EEC Treaty by the Commission of the
European Communities, in K.C. DAVIs, DisCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA

75 (1976).

The terms "regulations" and "directives," used in art. 87, are defined by other
Treaty provisions. See notes 267-75 infra and accompanying text.
244. ECSC, arts. 31-45; EEC, arts. 164-88; Euratom, arts. 136-60; Protocols
on the Statute of the Court of Justice (annexed to each of the treaties); Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, arts. 3-4.
245. ECSC, arts. 32, 32(a); EEC, arts. 165-66; Euratom, arts. 137-38.
246. ECSC, art. 32(b); EEC, art. 167; Euratom, art. 139.
247. ECSC, arts. 31, 33; EEC, arts. 164, 173; Euratom, arts. 136, 146.
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sion inaction, and to order the necessary measures for performance
of the functions required by the treaties. 4 ' In some specified areas
the Court may not only invalidate the act of the Council or Commission, but may also award other relief, such as damages arising
from torts. 49 As previously indicated, the Court has jurisdiction to
remove Commission members from office for serious misconduct,
and to decide complaints against Member States for treaty violations, after considering the report prepared by the Commission."' °
In addition to its powers of final decision, the Court is authorized
to render preliminary rulings upon referral from courts or tribunals
in Member States.2'
C.

2
RelationshipBetween the Council and the Commission

The above sketch indicates that the Council and the Commission jointly perform the functions of the chief executive, subject to
the very limited supervisory and consultative powers of the Assembly, and to the very significant legal controls of the Court.
Policy and attitudinal differences have developed between the
Council and the Commission as a predictable and even intended
result of the different composition of these two institutions. The
Council, consisting of senior ministers from each Member State,
provides a forum for protecting and asserting the interests of individual Member States, but the Commission, consisting of full-time
commissioners under pledge to serve the Communities rather than
their home states, tends to articulate Community values. When a
treaty requires unanimous action by the Council, the government
of each of the Member States in effect has an absolute veto available through its minister serving on the Council. The French Government, during the mid-1960's, favored extension of the unanimity requirement to more subjects on the theory that Member States
should be able to exercise a veto whenever important national
interests are at stake. The other five governments were not disposed to extend the availability of the veto. Under the Luxembourg Accord of 1966 all six members of the Council reached an
248. ECSC, art. 35; EEC, arts. 175-76; Euratom, arts. 148-49.
249. ECSC, art. 40; EEC, art. 178; Euratom, art. 151.
250. See note 228 supra (on removal powers); notes 234-36 supra and accompanying text (on deciding complaints against Member States for treaty violations).
251. See notes 321-26 infra and accompanying text.

252. D. LASOK & J. BRDGE, supra note 212, at 110-23; Van Hulle, supra note
212, at 592-96.
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agreement that has since served as a guideline though without the
2
formal effect of a treaty amendment.us
The Luxembourg Accord stresses the need for close cooperation
and coordination between the Commission and the Council. Before
' '2 4
the Commission adopts "any particularly important proposal, u
it should contact the Committee of Permanent Representatives of
the Member States. This committee, which assists the Council in
preparing matters for deliberation, can then explore the project
informally with staff personnel before the Commission develops a
formal proposal. The way is then smoothed for subsequent Council
action when the Commission's proposal comes up for formal approval.
When the treaties permit the Council to act by majority vote,
the Council will, nevertheless, endeavor to reach unanimity within
a reasonable time when "very important interests 255 of one or
more Member States are at stake. The French representative
added a comment to the Luxembourg Accord, not supported by
the other five member states, that in such situations the discussions must be continued until unanimity can be reached, implying
that a veto will ultimately be available if unanimity cannot be
reached. All six delegations agreed that there was a "divergence of
views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach
complete agreement."' ' 6
The result tended to slow down the work of the Council since it
attempted to reach unanimity even when the treaties impose no
such requirement. 27 Commission proposals tended to bog down
while awaiting Council approval. Although the Commission could,
theoretically, ask the Court to invalidate the Luxembourg Accord
as an unauthorized change in the processes of the Council, practical considerations have persuaded the Commission to tolerate the
253. The Luxembourg Accords, January 28-29, 1966, in SwEET & MAXWELL,
supra note 212, at B13-001 - 002.

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. The French position appears to have been modified. The Communique issued at the Paris summit meeting of the Nine on December 9-10, 1974,
supra note 239, includes the following:
In order to improve the functioning of the Council of the Community, [the
Heads of Government] consider that it is necessary to renounce the practice which consists of making agreement on all questions conditional on the
unanimous consent of the Member States, whatever their respective positions may be regarding the conclusions reached in Luxembourg on January
28, 1966.
257. D. LAsOK & J. BRDGE, supra note 212, at 118-21.
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Accord as the only feasible means of continuing the business of the
Communities under prevailing attitudes and conditions. Summit
meetings of the heads of government of the Member States have
been held on a fairly regular basis in recent years to facilitate toplevel discussion of issues arising in the Council.25
I D. Consultative Organs of the Communitiesu
'
The consultative organs established by each of the three treaties
have not been centralized by the merger treaty. The EEC Treaty
establishes the Economic and Social Committee;26 the Euratom
Treaty establishes the Scientific and Technical Committee;26' and
the ECSC Treaty establishes the Consultative Committee. 212
These organs are not regarded as "institutions" of the Communities, and they have neither decision-making power nor standing to
file petitions for review in the Court of Justice. The consultative
committees must be consulted by the Commission and the Council
in certain situations specified in the treaties and may be consulted
at any time deemed appropriate. If the Commission or Council
breaches these procedural rules by failing to consult with the committee when required, the resulting act is voidable by the Court.2 1
E. Rulemaking and Other "Executive" Acts in the Exercise of
"Constitutional"Powers
The "constitution" of the Communities (consisting of the three
258. In the 1974 Paris Communique, supra notes 239, 256, the heads of govern-

ment stated that they had "decided to meet, accompanied by the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, three times a year and whenever necessary, in the Council of the
Communities and in the context of political co-operation ....

These arrange-

ments do not in any way affect the rules and procedures laid down in the Treaties
or the provisions on political co-operation in the Luxembourg and Copenhagen

reports."
259. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 135-45, discusses consultative

organs established by the treaties, as well as other ancillary institutions created
by regulation, termed "management and rule-making committees." On the latter, see also Schindler, The Problemsof Decision-Makingby Way of the Management Committee Procedure in the European Economic Community, 8 CoMM.
MKT. L.R. 184 (1971).
260. EEC, art. 193.
261. Euratom, art. 134.
262. ECSC, art. 18.
263. SwET & MA WFAL, supra note 212, at B10-386, begins the discussion of
"[iJnfringement of an essential procedural requirement" under EEC, art. 173,

with the statement: "There would'fall under this head, the failure of an institution to consult another as required by the Treaty. . ... "
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major treaties and the related accords among the Member States)
authorizes the "executive" (consisting of the Council and the Commission) to take various types of actions without the need for enabling legislation from the Assembly. Thus, the acts taken by the
Council and the Commission are generally based directly upon
their constitutional powers. The treaties specify a variety of actions that can be taken by the Council and the Commission, some
of which can be regarded as rulemaking for the comparative purposes of this paper.
The EEC and Euratom Treaties authorize the Council and the
Commission, in the exercise of their respective functions, to "make
regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.

' 264 The

ECSC authorizes the Commission

(but not the Council) to "make decisions, made recommendations
or deliver opinions.12

5

However, the definitions of "recom-

mendations" and "decisions" in the EEC and Euratom Treaties
differ from those in the ECSC Treaty. The ECSC empowers the
Council to exercise its powers "in the cases provided for and in the
manner set out in this Treaty," 8 ' without any general elaboration
of the types of action that may be taken by the Council. The
following discussion is organized under headings corresponding to
those in the EEC and Euratom Treaties.
1. Regulations.-Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties: "A
regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 2

7

The clos-

est equivalent definition in the ECSC Treaty is the "decision,"
which is "binding in its entirety.

'28

The ECSC Treaty recognizes

that "decisions" may be either general or individual. 69 The
"general decision" under the EOSC Treaty is regarded as corresponding to the "regulation" under the EEC and Euratom TreatiesY0 As indicated by the definition, regulations go into effect in
all Member States without the need for implementing legislation
at the national level. Community regulations supersede inconsistent national legislation. Member States and citizens can invoke
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
art. 14,

EEC, art. 189; Euratom, art. 161.
ECSC, art. 14.
ECSC, art. 26.
EEC, art. 189; Euratom, art. 161.
ECSC, art. 14.
ECSC, art. 33, para. 2.
SwEET & MAXwELL, supra note 212, at B2-021, commenting on ECSC,
reaches this conclusion; accord, R. LAuwAARs, supra note 212, at 9.
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Community regulations in national courts."
2. Directives.-The EEC and Euratom Treaties state:
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods. 2
The ECSC definition of "recommendation" is almost identical. 273

Directives are issued when the Council or the Commission agrees
on a general result to be achieved, but is willing to let each Mem-

ber State work out its own means of implementation. Directives
generally include time limits within which the Member States are

required to take implementing action." 4 Although addressed to
Member States, directives may sometimes confer rights that citi-

zens can invoke in national courts.Y5
3.

Decisions.-Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties: "A deci-

sion shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. 2 76 The "individual decision" under the ECSC Treaty is
regarded as the equivalent.2 77 The addressee of a decision may be

either a Member State or a legal or natural person. Typical subjects include the granting of exceptions or authorizations and the

imposition of fines.28 One of the difficult questions arising under

this provision is the extent to which a decision addressed to a

Member State confers rights upon individuals. This will be explored later in conjunction with the discussion of review by the
Court of Justice.
4. Recommendations and Opinions.-The EEC and Euratom

Treaties state that "recommendations and opinions shall have no
' 27
binding force.
The ECSC makes a similar statement about
"opinions."' ' 0 Professor Mathijsen explains that under the EEC/
Euratom terminology:
271. R. LAuwAAs, supra note 212, at 8-27; D. LAsoK & J. BRmGE, supra note
212, at 75-77.
272. EEC, art. 189; Euratom, art. 161.
273. ECSC, art. 14.
274. D. LASOK & J. BRMGE, supra note 212, at 77.
275. R. LAuwAARs, supra note 212, at 27-37; D. LASOK & J. BRDGE, supra note
212, at 77-78.
276. EEC, art. 189; Euratom, art. 161.
277. SwEET & MAxwELL, supra note 212, at B2-021, commenting on ECSC,
art. 14, reaches this conclusion. Accord, D. LAsoC & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212,
at 78-79. More complexities are developed in R. LAUAmS, supra note 212, at 3750.
278. P. MATHLISEN, supra note 212, at 186.
279. EEC, art. 189; Euratom, art. 161.
280. ECSC, art. 14.
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Generally speaking, "recommendations" aim at obtaining a certain
action or behavior from the addressee while "opinions" express a
point of view at the request of a third party; this distinction however
is legally irrelevant."'
F.

Form

Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties:
Regulations, directives and decisions of the Council and of the Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall
refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained
pursuant to this Treaty. 2
The ECSC imposes a similar requirement not only with regard to
acts with binding effect (the ECSC's equivalents of regulations,
directives and decisions), but also for opinions, which are nonbinding under all treaties.23
G.

Publication,Notification, and Effective Date

The EEC and Euratom Treaties provide:
Regulations shall be published in the Official Journal of the Community. They shall enter into force on the date specified in them or,
in the absence thereof, on the twentieth day following their publication. Directives and decisions shall be notified to those to whom they
are addressed and shall take effect upon such notification.24
The ECSC provision is similar. The publication requirement of
the treaties, as indicated by the above text, is limited to regulations. In practice, the Official Journal publishes many directives
and decisions as well. The Court of Justice has encouraged expanded publication.28
H.

Proceedings Before the Court of Justice for Annulment of
287
Council or Commission Acts

A previous heading included a general sketch of the Court of
281. P. MATmiSmN, supra note 212, at 187.
282. EEC, art. 190; Euratom, art. 162.
283. ECSC, art. 15.
284. EEC, art. 191; Euratom, art. 163.
285. ECSC, art. 15 is less elaborate than the EEC and Euratom provisions
cited in supra note 284.
286. P. MATsEN, supra note 212, at 190-91.
287. In addition to works previously cited, see Kavass, The Court of Justice
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Justice, as background material on the institutions of the Communities. The following discussion explores in more detail the role
of the Court in the annulment of acts of the Council and Commission.
1. Acts Subject to Review.-All three treaties authorize the
Court of Justice to review the legality of "acts of the Council and
the Commission other than recommendations or opinions." This
terminology is in the EEC and Euratom Treaties. Equivalent
2 The
terms used in the ECSC Treaty produce a similar result.Hl
discussion will continue to use EEC and Euratom terminology and
will make separate reference to the ECSC Treaty only when the
result differs.
The quoted provision clearly allows the Court to review regulations, directives, and decisions (since these are the types of actions
described in the treaties other than recommendations or opinions).
Moreover, in Commission v. Council,211 the Court determined that
it could review other types of action if the act at issue had been
' Thus, the Court agreed to
"intended to produce a legal effect."291
review the validity of Council deliberations concerning the EEC's
approach to the European Agreement on Working Conditions in
Road Transport. The Court observed that these deliberations were
"designed to define a course of conduct that was mandatory for the
,,2
institutions as well as for the member states ....
2. Standing of Private Parties Under the EEC and Euratom
of the European Communities: An Annotated Bibliography-1951-1973,8 VAD.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 523 (1975); D.G. VAL.Er'rrm, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNMES

(1965); Note, Jurisdictionand Procedure of the Court of Jus-

tice of the European Communities, 8 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (1975).

288. EEC, art. 173; Euratom, art. 146. The ECSC Treaty reaches a similar
result by slightly different wording; see note 289 infra and accompanying text.

289. ECSC, art. 33 confers jurisdiction to review "decisions or recommendations." These are the acts of binding authority that can be taken under ECSC,

art. 14, corresponding to the EEC-Euratom acts described in those treaties as
"regulations, decisions, and directives." These constitute all acts that can be
taken with binding authority under EEC, art. 189 and Euratom, art. 161. The
only other possible acts under those treaties are "recommendations and opinions," and these are declared non-reviewable by EEC, art. 173 and Euratom, art.

146. The result is that in the ECSC Treaty, as in the EEC-Euratom Treaties, the
Court of Justice can review all acts of binding authority and no others.
290. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8134, 10 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 355 (1971).
291. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. MaT. REP. (CCH) at 7526, 10
Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 357.
292. Id.
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Treaties.-Under all three treaties, suit for annulment may be
brought by a Member State, the Council, or the Commission.2

3

1

In

addition, limited standing is conferred upon private parties. The
Treaties of Rome (EEC and Euratom) differ in this respect from
the Treaty of Paris (ECSC).
The EEC and Euratom Treaties provide that any natural or
legal person may "institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the
form of a regulation or decision addressed to another person, is of
direct and individual concern to the former.

' 24

In Confederation

Nationale des Producteursde Fruitset Legumes v. EEC Council,29
the Court adopted a literal reading of the text of the treaties.
Decisions are the only types of act that can be challenged by private persons under this provision; consequently, private parties
have no standing to bring suit to challenge regulations or directives. The text further provides that the only decisions that can be
challenged by a private party are those that are (1) addressed to
the plaintiff, (2) in the form of a regulation, but nonetheless of
direct and individual concern to the plaintiff, or (3) in the form of
a decision addressed to another person, but still of direct and individual concern to the plaintiff.
Commentators point out that the first category (decisions addressed to the plaintiff) poses no problems because the interest of
the plaintiff is readily identifiable.299 The second category (decisions in the form of regulations that concern the plaintiff) has been
interpreted as referring only to acts that have been disguised as
regulations, although they are actually decisions. The private
party directly affected is thus allowed to challenge the use of the
improper form.

297

This is the only situation in which a private party

aggrieved by a regulation can bring suit to challenge it under the
EEC and Euratom Treaties.
More complex problems are posed under the third category (decisions addressed to another person but nonetheless of direct and
individual concern to the plaintiff), especially when the addressee
of the decision is a Member State. In Plaumann & Co. v. EEC
293.
294.
295.
296.

ECSC, arts. 33, 38; EEC, art. 173; Euratom, art. 146.
EEC, art. 173; Euratom, art. 146.
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8005 (1962).
P. KAPTEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, supra note 212, at 166-72; SwEgr &
MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B1O-385 (commenting on EEC, art. 173); P. MATmuSEN, supra note 212, at 156-58.
297. SwEEr & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B10-385.
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Commission,"'8 the Court held that a Member State is a "person"
for purposes of this provision. Thus, a decision addressed to a
Member State can qualify as being addressed to "another person."
However, Plaumann and subsequent cases have given very restrictive interpretations to the "direct and individual concern" requirement. Private plaintiffs, therefore, have difficulty in establishing
adtheir standing to institute proceedings to challenge 2decisions
9
dressed to Member States unider the Rome Treaties.

3. Standing of PrivateParties Under the ECSC Treaty.-The
ECSC Treaty allows enterprises or associations of enterprises to
"institute proceedings against decisions or recommendations concerning them which are individual in character or against general
decisions or recommendations which they consider to involve a
misuse of powers affecting them."3 This provision confers standing which is narrower in one respect, but broader in another, than
the corresponding articles of the Rome Treaties. Standing under
the ECSC is narrower since it is given only to enterprises and
associations of enterprises, while the EEC and Euratom Treaties
extend standing to any natural or legal person. On the other hand,
the ECSC confers broader standing by permitting the private
party to challenge "general decisions or recommendations" (the
ECSC equivalents of the EEC categories of regulations and directives) if he claims to be affected by a misuse of powers.
4. Grounds for Annulment.-Under the EEC and Euratom
Treaties the Court must annul acts of the Council or Commission
on any of the following grounds: lack of competence; infringement
of an essential procedural requirement; infringement of the treaty
or of any rule of law relating to its application; or misuse of powers. 10 The ECSC Treaty provides that acts of the Commission shall
be annulled on the same grounds. °2 Regarding acts of the Council
and the Assembly, however, the ECSC Treaty authorizes annulment only for lack of competence or infringement of an essential
requirement of law."'
An act is voidable for lack of competence if the institution had
no authority to perform the act in question.0 4 Meroni v. High
298.
299.
300.
301.

[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8013 (1963).
See sources cited in note 296 supra.
ECSC, art. 33.
EEC, art. 173; Euratom, art. 146.

302. ECSC, art. 33.

303. ECSC, art. 38.
304. D. LASOK & J. BRmGE, supra note 212, at 161; P. MATHIJSEN, supra note
212, at 158-59.
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Authority3 5 indicates how this can occur. It involved certain levies
imposed by authorities in Brussels, under color of delegations of
power from the High Authority. The Court of Justice held that the
High Authority had improperly attempted to delegate its power.
Therefore, its act of delegation was invalid; the recipient of the
delegation had not acquired any lawful jurisdiction; and the acts
of the recipient of the delegation were void for lack of competence.
In some cases, the Court of Justice has sustained the validity of
acts although procedural errors were committed. This has occurred
when the errors were relatively harmless, and the procedural requirement infringed was not "essential" to the outcome. For example, in A CF Chemiefarma N. V. v. Commission,"'6 the Court found
that the Commission's failure to release an investigation of price
fixing was harmless error. Similarly, in Weighart v. Euratom
Commission,"7 the Court ruled that the absence of a member of
the Commission during the taking of some of the evidence was
harmless error where that member was later given a written summary of the evidence.
The Court is understandably less willing to tolerate procedural
irregularities that violate express treaty provisions. Particular attention has been devoted to the requirement that the Commission
(under all three treaties) and the Council (under the Treaties of
Rome) state the reasons upon which their acts are based, and make
express reference to any proposals or opinions required by the
treaty.3 ° In Federal Republic of Germany v. EEC Commission,"9
the Court relied on this requirement as the basis for annulling an
import quota, which the Commission had justified only by stating
that "information gathered" indicated "that the production of
wines of this type is amply sufficient."' 310
Annulment for infringement of a treaty or of any rule of law
relating to its application requires subdivision into two component
parts. Violations of a treaty are not limited to violations of
essential requirements, but, instead, extend to violations of any
requirement. Consequently, the doctrine of harmless error will not
protect an act from annulment if any treaty violation occurs.,'
305.
481.
306.
307.
308.
309.

[1958] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 51, cited in 2 VALENTINE, supra note 287, at
[1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CoMM.
5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1966).
See notes 282-83 supra.
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM.

MKT.

REP. (CCH)

8083 (1970).

MKT.

REP. (CCH)

8012 (1963).

310. Id. at 7254.

311.

Street, Administrative Law and JudicialReview in the E.E.C., in THE
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Violation of a rule of law is comparable to the violation de la loi of
French administrative law. 31 2 Professor Street and others have

speculated that the European Court of Justice may ultimately use
"violation of any rule of law" as the basis for imposing general
3
principles of law upon the organs of the Communities.

3

Annulment due to a misuse of power is derived from
detournement de pouvoir in French administrative law.314 While

the Conseil d'Etat has made extensive use of this concept in reEuropean Court of
viewing the acts of the French executive, the
31 5
Justice has exercised considerable restraint.

5. Time for Filing a Petition.-Under the EEC and Euratom
Treaties, a proceeding seeking annulment of an act of the Council
or Commission must be filed within two months of the publication
of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the
absence thereof, of the day on which it came to his attention.3 18 The

corresponding period under the ECSC Treaty is one month.17
I. Defense of Illegality Against Enforcement of Regulations
Even after expiration of the time for filing a petition for annulment, the EEC and Euratom Treaties permit a party to proceedings in which a regulation of the Council or Commission is in issue
to plead the invalidity of that regulation on any of the grounds
available in actions for annulment. 3 1 s Since the challenger is ob-

viously too late to appear as plaintiff after expiration of the time
for filing, this provision is designed to permit the defendant to
assert the invalidity of a regulation in proceedings in which the
regulation is being invoked to his detriment. This defense, which
is analogous to the French exception d'il~galit, 3 9 can only be

raised with regard to regulations. If the defendant prevails, the
regulation remains in general effect but is not imposed upon him. 20
LAw

OF THE

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

COMMON MARKET 40, 48 (B. Wortley ed. 1974).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48-49.
EEC, art. 173; Euratom, art. 146.
ECSC, art. 33.
EEC, art. 184; Euratom, art. 156.
The analogy is noted in SwEEr & MAXWELL, supra note 212, at B10-410;
D. LAsOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at 166-67.
320. Street, supra note 311, at 51; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 212, at

166.
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PreliminaryRulings by the Court of Justice

Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties, the Court of Justice has
jurisdiction to give "preliminary rulings" concerning: (1) treaty
interpretation; (2) the validity and interpretation of acts of Community institutions; and (3) the interpretation of the statutes of
bodies established by the Council, if those statutes authorize such
rulings." Although the text of the treaties authorizes preliminary
rulings on the validity and interpretation of the "acts" of community institutions, it has been taken to refer only to acts which
have legally binding force. Preliminary rulings on the validity of
recommendations and opinions, therefore, appear to be unavailable.3
The treaties provide:
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment,
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any
such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal
of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the
matter before the Court of Justice."'
Preliminary rulings under these provisions are not intended to dispose of the entire case between the parties in the national court.
Proceedings in the national court are suspended while that court
certifies an "abstract" question to the Court of Justice, which
renders its response to the national court. The latter can then
proceed to adjudicate the rights of the parties.2 4 The comparable
provision of the ECSC Treaty states:
The Court shall have sole jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on
the validity of acts of the High Authority and of the Council where
such validity is at issue in proceedings brought before a national
3
court or tribunal.
321. EEC, art. 177; Euratom, art. 150.
322. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 212, at 103, supports this position and

adds the observation that "an act couched in the form of a recommendation but
as a matter of fact having the effect of a binding act in the sense of article 189

would, it seems, be open to annulment in appropriate circumstances."

323. EEC, art. 177; Euratom, art. 150.
324. P. MATHJSEN, supra note 212, at 163-66; F. JAcoBs & A. DURAND, supra
note 212, at 194.
325. ECSC, art. 41.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

42

[Vol I0: 1

On the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to render preliminary
rulings under all treaties, Professor Mathijsen comments:
It is clear from the abundance of questions of interpretation put to
the Court of Justice that here lies an essential function, not only in
regard to the development of Community law, but also as an instrument put at the disposal of natural and legal persons when confronted with self-executing Community measures whose legality
they cannot directly challenge in the Court of Justice."
K.

Summary of Executive Rulemaking in the European
Communities

The treaties establishing the European Communities authorize
the Council and the Commission to take various types of action,
including some that can be regarded as executive rulemaking. The
main attributes of each type are synthesized below.
1. Regulations.-Regulations are generally applicable throughout the communities and are legally binding on all Member States
and citizens. Regulations must be accompanied by reasons and by
citations to any required consultations. They must be published in
the Official Journal. The Council, the Commission, or a Member
State may bring an action in the Court of Justice for annulment
of any regulation. Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties, private
parties may not bring such a suit. The ECSC Treaty confers standing upon enterprises or associations of enterprises. Regulations
may be collaterally attacked by the defense of illegality. They are
also subject to preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice.
2. Directives.-Directives are addressed to Member States and
are binding as to the result to be achieved, but leave the Member
States with discretion to choose appropriate methods. Directives
must be accompanied by reasons and by citations to any required
consultations. They must be notified to the addressee state, but
publication is not required. An action for annulment of any directive is similar to an action for annulment of a regulation, but
directives cannot be collaterally attacked by the defense of illegality. Although a directive may be addressed to only one Member
State, it nevertheless is intended to bring about general effects
within that state. It can therefore be regarded as a "rule," at least
from the perspective of the affected state's citizens.
3. Decisions.-Decisions are addressed to Member States or to
legal or natural persons and are fully binding. A decision addressed
326. P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 212, at 166.
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to an individual person is evidently not a "rule." A decision addressed to a Member State, however, may be considered a rule,
because the intent may be to bring about general effects within the
state. Furthermore, a decision addressed to a large number of individuals, or to associations or other representational parties, may
have sufficient general applicability to qualify under some concepts of rulemaking.
Decisions must be accompanied by reasons and by citations to
any required consultations. They must be notified to the addressee, but publication is not required. An action may be brought in
the Court of Justice, for annulment of any decision, by the Council,
the Commission, or a Member State. In addition, the EEC and
Euratom Treaties grant standing to any legal or natural person
who is the addressee of a decision, or who is directly and individually concerned with a decision addressed to another. The ECSC
Treaty confers standing upon enterprises or associations of enterprises with slightly less stringent requirements for demonstrating
the necessary interest. Decisions are not subject to the defense of
illegality. They are subject to preliminary rulings by the Court of
Justice.
4. Recommendations and Opinions. -Recommendations and
opinions are not binding. If intended as general statements of interpretation, they may be analogous to interpretative rules under
United States concepts of administrative law. For that reason they
are included in this summary of rulemaking activities of the European Council and Commission.
Recommendations and opinions need not be accompanied by
reasons or citations to consultations, except under the ECSC
Treaty. Neither publication nor notification is required, although
obviously these acts are of little use unless brought to the attention
of parties likely to be interested. Recommendations and opinions
are not subject to the action for annulment in the Court of Justice,
nor to the defense of illegality, nor, apparently, to preliminary
ruling by the Court of Justice.
VI.

COMPARATIVE COMMENTS

Rulemaking by the chief executive, in the exercise of powers
derived from the constitution, exists in each of the four legal systems under study. The literature of each system takes its own
distinctive approach toward the description and analysis of executive rulemaking, and these descriptions have generally been followed in this study. This concluding section compares the four
systems.
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OrganizationalStructure of the Chief Executive

The single-headed executive of the United States stands in
marked contrast to the parliamentary cabinet system in the
United Kingdom, the interlocking functions of the President of the
Republic and the Prime Minister in France, and the combination
of the Council and the Commission in the European Communities.
Each system, however, offers remedies from relatively independent
organs of government if the chief executive attempts to wield unauthorized or arbitrary powers. Furthermore, in each system the
executive must depend upon independent organs of government
for the appropriation of funds. These organs are accountable, in
one way or another, to a constituency. This study would contain
more dramatic, but possibly less useful, contrasts if it extended to
other regimes that do not share this view of the rule of law.
B. Statutory and ConstitutionalPowers
In all four systems the chief executive derives powers in certain
subject areas directly from the constitution. In addition, in three
of the systems-the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France-the chief executive is statutorily required as the delegate
of the legislature to perform a wide variety of governmental functions. This situation does not exist in the European Communities.
The Treaties (regarded as the "constitution" for purposes of this
study) confer a broad range of lawmaking power directly upon the
Council and the Commission (regarded here as the "chief executive"). Relatively little lawmaking power is left in the hands of the
Assembly (regarded here as the "legislature"). The Assembly does
not have occasion to delegate its powers to the Council and the
Commission, which do not need the Assembly's authorization for
their general functions.
The difference between the three systems in which legislative
delegation to the executive is a pervasive fact of government and
the one system where it is not may reflect the limited usefulness
of this article's terminology, describing the Treaties as a "constitution," the Council and the Commission as the "chief executive,"
and the Assembly as the "legislature."
C. PresidentialRulemaking in the Exercise of Constitutional
Powers
Although the law varies greatly in amount of detail, from the
highly elaborate Treaties of the European Communities to the
"unwritten" traditions of the United Kingdom, some common fea-
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tures can be discerned.
1. Types of Presidential Rulemaking.-Presidents of the
United States issue proclamations and executive orders. These
acts vary in format and subject matter. In addition, Presidents
make "determinations," countersign the acts of subordinate officers, and issue interpretative statements. Some Presidential rules
require implementation by the government agencies affected.
The prerogative powers of the British Sovereign are formally
expressed, either as Orders in Council signed by the Clerk of the
Privy Council, or as proclamations signed by the Sovereign in person. It may be assumed that these are the historical antecedents
of the American executive order and proclamation, respectively.
The French executive carries out its constitutional powers by a
variety of instruments-decrees by the President of the Republic
or the Prime Minister; arr~t~sby ministers (under delegation from
the Prime Minister), and informal statements, including circulars,
instructions, and directives.
The European Communities have the most elaborate approach.
The Council and the Commission may issue regulations (binding
Member States and citizens), directives (binding Member States
as to the result to be achieved, comparable to American executive
orders addressed to other government agencies), decisions (some of
which may achieve sufficient generality to be regarded as "rules"),
and recommendations and opinions (comparable to interpretative
rules in-American administrative law).
2. Proceduresfor PresidentialRulemaking.-A series of executive orders establishes a confidential process within the executive
branch of the United States government for processing proclamations and executive orders. This process does not restrict the President, but merely organizes the manner in which his assistants
circulate drafts of the documents.
The British system uses the formal procedures of the Privy
Council, meeting with the Sovereign and acting upon the advice
of the Cabinet or an individual minister. This advice emanates
from meetings of the Cabinet, where policies are formulated in a
collegial setting.
The central feature of the French system is deliberation by the
Council of Ministers, leading to promulgation of a decree. Other
types of rulemaking are possible, however. The President of the
Republic may issue decrees without deliberation by the Council of
Ministers, and individual ministers may issue arr~t~s without the
Council's deliberation. Decrees are countersigned by the ministers
responsible for their execution. In some circumstances, the Conseil
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d'Etat must be consulted before the promulgation of a decree.
The treaties of the European Communities, supplemented by
the Luxembourg Accords, establish elaborate deliberative procedures involving both the Council and the Commission. In addition,
some matters require consultation with the Assembly or another
consultative organ of the Communities.
United States procedure contrasts sharply with that of the other
three systems. When exercising functions derived from the Constitution, the President of the United States is subject only to procedural requirements imposed by himself or by a predecessor. By
contrast, the chief executives of the other systems studied are subject to procedures imposed by their respective constitutions, which
all require significant deliberations with collegial groups possessing some political power.
3. Statement of Reasons.-The European Treaties require regulations, directives, and decisions to include a statement of reasons and a reference to any required proposals or opinions. The
French Constitution does not impose such a requirement, but the
Conseil d'Etat has encouraged the executive to give a statement
of reasons while a case is under review, even if reasons were not
provided at the time of promulgation of the rule. In practice,
French decrees are generally accompanied by extensive statement
of reasons. Neither British nor American law requires reasons to
accompany executive acts.
4. Publicationand Effective Date.-The European Treaties
require regulations to be published, and to become effective on the
twentieth day following publication, unless another effective date
is specified. Directives and decisions shall be notified to the affected parties. As a matter of practice, many directives and decisions are published, although the Treaties do not impose this requirement.
In France and the United States publication is required, not by
constitutional text, but by a self-regulatory act of the executive.
The French decree of 1870 requires that all decrees be published
and become effective on or after publication. In the United States,
executive orders establish the requirement that proclamations and
executive orders must be published in the Federal Register. Britain
has no general requirement for the publication of prerogative
proclaimations or Orders in Council.
5. Binding Effect. -The major concept regarding binding effect is the French theory of parallel jurisdiction and parallel form.
Under this concept, an act of an agency retains its binding effect
upon the agency and other parties until it is superseded by a later
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act, which must be issued pursuant to the same grant of jurisdiction, and in the same form as the original-unless a higher authority intervenes. This means that the chief executive is bound by
prior executive acts-even the acts of predecessors-until the chief
executive promulgates a new act of similar form or a higher authority intervenes. As applied to the United States, this theory would
bind the President to executive orders issued by himself and his
predecessors, unless and until he promulgates a new executive
order repealing the old one, or the Constitution is amended, or a
court renders a constitutional ruling invalidating the old executive
order.
The Treaties of the European Communities declare that regulations, directives, and decisions are "binding." The theory of parallel jurisdiction and parallel form is presumably part of the
"binding" effect of these instruments. The same theory is showing
signs of acceptance in the United States, although it is not referred
to here by its French name. No comparable theory could be found
in British literature.
D.

Judicialand Legislative Controls Over Presidential
Rulemaking Under the Constitution

In all of the legal systems studied, the chief executive is subject
to general political pressures from the legislature. In addition, certain specific controls are exercised, either by the legislature or the
courts or both, before and after the chief executive promulgates
rules in the exercise of powers derived from the constitution.
1. Specific Controls Before the Issuance of Rules.-The Congress of the United States has only a limited opportunity to impose
prior controls upon the President's exercise of rulemaking authority under the Constitution. Clearly, Congress cannot restrict the
scope of the President's constitutional powers. In the twilight zone
between presidential and congressional powers, however, Congress
may, by its non-use of certain powers, encourage the President to
be expansive in interpreting his own powers. It has also been suggested that Congress has the authority to require the President to
follow prescribed procedures even in the performance of his constitutional powers.
In the United Kingdom, Parliament has complete power to reduce the scope of the royal prerogative, thereby depriving the executive of future constitutional authority over a designated subject
matter. The French Conseil Constitutionnel,by its review of statutes before promulgation, directly affects the scope of the legislature's power, thereby conversely affecting the residual power that
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can be exercised by the executive. The European Treaties do not
provide for pre-promulgation review of executive acts, but the
complex structure within the executive itself evidently builds substantial safeguards into the system.
2. Specific Controls After the Issuance of Rules.-The American courts have established their authority to review the constitutionality of Presidential actions, including rulemaking, although in
practice the review has generally accorded great deference to the
discretion of the President. The British courts also review the validity of prerogative actions, but only to ascertain the existence
and extent of the prerogative. The French Conseil d'Etat engages
in penetrating review of all executive acts, and its authority is
beyond question, although not spelled out in the French Constitution. The European Court of Justice enjoys review powers, described in detail in the Treaties, resembling in many respects the
powers of the French Conseil d'Etat.
E. A Final Comment on PresidentialRulemaking in the United
States
When engaged in rulemaking in the exercise of constitutional
powers, the President of the United States is subject to very few
controls, compared to his counterparts in the other systems. The
President is the chief executive; the Constitution subjects him to
no particular rulemaking procedure, and he is subject only to the
minimal procedural requirements prescribed by executive orders.
He is not required to give reasons for his acts, and the notion that
he is bound by previous executive orders is only slowly gaining
acceptance. In these respects, the President differs from each of his
counterparts in the other three systems.
The great procedural freedom enjoyed by the President of the
United States when exercising constitutional powers contrasts not
only with other countries, but also with the restraints that are
imposed upon him when he acts as a delegate of Congress. He then
becomes subject to the Administrative Procedure Act or such other
procedural statutes as Congress chooses to impose. Additional procedures and reasons may be required, and prior parallel actions are
generally recognized as binding.
The American Presidency should not necessarily be modeled
after the executive of any other jurisdiction, nor should the constitutional powers of the President be exercised like delegations from
Congress. The President does, however, appear to enjoy more procedural freedom when exercising constitutional powers than is justified by the Founding Fathers' vision of "energy in the executive."
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Although the Constitution could theoretically be amended to subject the President to procedural controls in the exercise of constitutional powers, such an amendment can hardly be anticipated. Nor
does it appear likely that Congress or the courts will impose significant procedural controls upon the President's exercise of constitutional powers. The remaining source of procedural control is by
presidential self-regulation. The existing executive order on executive orders requires expansion to provide a more comprehensive
procedural framework for presidential acts in the exercise of constitutional powers.
F. Executive Rulemaking in the States
Like the President, state governors can subject themselves to
self-regulation by promulgating executive orders establishing pro.cedures for the exercise of constitutional powers. Reform at the
state level is also possible through the insertion of new provisions
in state constitutions requiring the promulgation of procedural
standards for the exercise of the governor's constitutional powers.
The relative ease and frequency of amendment of state constitutions suggests that reform by constitutional amendment may be
feasible.
G. Beyond Procedure-Rulemakingas a Preferred Method for
Developing Executive Policy
Part I of this article offered the thesis that the elements, consequences, and opportunities of presidential rulemaking in the exercise of constitutional powers should be clarified, and that Presidents should use rulemaking, to the extent feasible, as the preferred method of exercising their constitutional powers.32 This
proposition suggests that rulemaking be used, not only to establish
procedures to be followed in the exercise of constitutional powers,
but also to promulgate substantive rules to reduce the scope of
discretion available in solving future individual questions. The
President must, however, retain his authority to amend the rules,
in compliance with pre-existing procedures established by himself
or a predecessor, if the rules no longer conform to presidential
policy.
The comparative discussion of Britain, France, and the European Communities has dealt with procedures for executive rule327. Levinson, PresidentialSelf-Regulation Through Rulemaking (pt. 1), 9
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 695, 699 (1976).
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making, but contains virtually no mention of substantive rulemaking. This reflects the content of the constitutions and doctrinal
writings of those jurisdictions, which deal mainly with procedure
rather than substance in executive rulemaking.
In a comparative study, Professor Kenneth C. Davis notes that
British and French tribunals have recently developed a tolerant
view toward the voluntary adoption of rules by administrative
agencies as a means of cutting back the scope of future discretion
in the exercise of powers delegated by statute."' While this type
of self-regulation by rulemaking may be permitted in those countries, it is not required. Davis also notes the use of executive rules,
in the European Communities, to develop substantive policies for
implementation of the treaty provisions on unfair competition.2
American law and theory, largely because of Davis' earlier work,
has moved at least as far as any of the other jurisdictions studied
in developing substantive standards by rulemaking. These American developments, however, have been concentrated in the agencies that carry out statutory programs. The utility of substantive
as well as procedural rulemaking should be recognized, not only for
agencies performing statutory functions, but also for chief executives in the exercise of their constitutional powers.
328.
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